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In 1967 Congress established the Corporation for Public Broad-
casting (CPB) to disburse federal funds to public broadcasting sta-
tions and program producers.' CPB's creation raised considerable
concern that this unprecedented governmental subsidy would influ-
ence program content and inhibit freedom of expression. 2 The re
cent report of the Carnegie Commission on the Future of Public
Broadcasting (Carnegie II) demonstrates that this concern was well
founded. 3 Indeed, the safeguards of the Public Broadcasting Act of
1967 and the Public Telecommunications Financing Act of 19784
provide inadequate protection from the governmental control ac-
companying the government subsidy.5
This Note argues that direct subsidy of expression through the
current institutional structure of CPB and its operating entity, the
Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), violates the First Amendment.
The Note first demonstrates that CPB and PBS are sufficiently linked
with the government to come within the state action doctrine, and
thus are bound by constitutional restrictions. Analyzing the structure
of public broadcasting, the Note determines that the current sys-
tem creates unconstitutional prior restraints on expression. The Note
examines the structural and financial modifications proposed by
I. See Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365 (codified at 47
U.S.C. §§ 390-399 (1976)). Public broadcasting stations, distinguished from other stations
by their lack of advertising, are owned and operated by universities, local school boards
and communities. This Note will focus on public television, rather than public radio,
because of the former's greater influence and share of the subsidy.
2. See, e.g., The Public Television Act of 1967: Hearings on S. 1160 Before the Sub-
conm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 9
(1967) (statement of Sen. Pastore) (need to protect programming from federal interference)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1160]; Public Television Act of 1967: Hearings on H.R.
6736, S. 1160 and H.R. 4140 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 105 (1967) (statement of Rep. Brown) (uneasiness at precedent of gov-
ernment support for mass medium) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 6736].
3. CARNEGIE COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING, A PUBLIC TRUST (1979)
(noting public broadcasting's manipulation by government because of lack of insulation
and adequate funding) [hereinafter cited as CARNEGIE II].
4. Pub. L. No. 95-567, 92 Stat. 2405 (1978) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 390-399 (West
Supp. 1979)).
5. Congress recognized that the First Amendment forbids governmental supervision of
expression. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 398 (West Supp. 1979) (United States department, agency,
officer, or employee forbidden to exercise direction, supervision, or control over public
broadcasting, CPB, or grantees). This restriction, however, does not apply to either CPB
or the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS); they are separate nonprofit organizations, see
notes 11 & 20 infra, and were established to perform supervisory functions, see 47 U.S.C.A.
§ 396(g) (West Supp. 1979) (delegation to CPB of plenary supervisory authority).
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Carnegie II and demonstrates the inadequacy of those recommenda-
tions. It then suggests adoption of a constitutionally acceptable al-
ternative to the present structure that severs the state action nexus
by institutional and financial reform of the mode of appointment to,
and funding of, the public broadcasting system. 6
I. The Federal Government and Public Broadcasting
The mode of subsidy created by the Public Broadcasting Act in-
extricably involves the government in programming determinations.
This government involvement makes CPB and PBS state actors, sub-
ject to the requirements of the First Amendment.
A. The Structure of the Public Broadcasting System
Although public broadcasting has had a long history in the United
States,7 Congress did not address the financial difficulties of public
stations until the 1960's.8 In 1965 the Carnegie Commission on Edu-
6. Some commentators have argued that the federal government has an affirmative
duty to make opportunities for expression available. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION 629 (1970); cf. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 17 (1948) (Congress responsible for promoting free speech to cultivate general
intelligence). See generally Comment, Access to State-Owned Communications Media-The
Public Forum Doctrine, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1410, 1411 n.3 (1979) (citing commentators
arguing for affirmative right of access). As this Note argues, it is not the subsidy per se
for public broadcasting that is objectionable but, rather, the conditions attached to the
subsidy: when funding is triggered by the content of speech and not the fact of the speech
itself, federal support cannot withstapd constitutional scrutiny. Cf. Kamenshine, The First
Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 1104, 1130-32
(1979) (arguing that support for broadcasters raises political "establishment clause" con-
cerns; dangers of overtly political presentations diminished when regulatory safeguards
exist). But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 n.127 (1976) (distinguishing religion and
speech clauses and rejecting existence of an establishment clause for speech).
7. The first public radio station began broadcasting in 1919, J. MACY, To IRRIGATE A
WASTELAND 5 (1974), the first noncommercial television station in 1953, id. at 10. There are
currently 276 noncommercial television stations. TELEVISION DIGEST, Aug. 27, 1979, at I.
8. Noncommercial broadcasting experienced financial difficulties from its inception
because advertising on public stations is impermissible and private support has been
erratic. See Public Broadcasting-1973: Hearings on H.R. 4560, H.R. 6872, H.R. 8538 and
S. 1090 Before the Stibcomm. on Communications and Power of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 96 (1973) (statement of McGeorge
Bundy) (figures demonstrate fluctuation of Ford Foundation support). Moreover, because
two-thirds of noncommercial television stations broadcast on the less desirable UHF band,
see FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, COMPARABILITY FOR UHF TELEVISION: A REPORT
TO THE U.S. CONGRESS BY THE FCC (Dec. 1978), and VHF frequencies are unavailable in
most of the larger markets, see 47 C.F.R. § 73.606(b) (1979) (table of assignments showing
few noncommercial stations with VHF frequencies in largest markets); CARNEGIE II, supra
note 3, at 314, fewer viewers, and thus fewer potential contributors, have access to such
stations.
Pressure for federal support increased throughout the 1950's and a federal subsidy for
public broadcasting facilities was initiated in 1962. See Act of May 1, 1962, Pub. L. No.
87-447, 76 Stat. 64 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-394 (1976)).
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cational Television (Carnegie I) was established to assess the over-
all needs of public broadcasting; it recommended that a nonprofit
Corporation for Public Television be created to receive and dis-
burse federal funds.9 In response to the report and presidential en-
dorsement, 10 Congress established CPB as a partial embodiment of
the Carnegie I recommendations."
CPB distributes a fixed percentage of the federal funds it receives
directly to broadcast licensees for their discretionary use through
Community Service Grants (CSGs).*12 It retains the balance for ad-
ministrative expenses,' research and interconnection operating costs, 1 4
and for program production funding.ra To enhance its control over
this funding, Congress established several mechanisms such as annual
reports and government audits.'0 Congress also enacted measures to
guide station conduct and to facilitate direct supervision of station
performance.' 7 These provisions closely involve the government in
the public broadcasting system.' 8
9. CARNEGIE COMM'N ON EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION, PUBLIC TELEVISION: A PROGRAM FOR
ACTION 36-41, 68-73 (1967) [hereinafter cited as CARNEGIE I]. In 1977, CPB and other
federal agencies provided .$135 million of the total public broadcasting income of $482
million. CARNEGIE II, supra note 3, at 104.
10. See The State of the Union, 3 'WEEKLY CousP. OF PREs. Doc. 26, 30 (Jan. 16, 1967).
11. See Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365, 368 (codified
at 47 U.S.C. § 596(b) (1976)) (establishing CPB as nonprofit corporation in District of
Columbia).
12. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(k)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1979). Appropriations are linked, on a
matching basis, to the total amount of nonfederal financial support received by public
broadcasting in the fiscal year prior to the fiscal year that precedes the year of appro-
priation. See id. § 396(k)(1)(B) & (C). Each station is given a basic grant, equal to 0.1% of
CPB's total appropriation. The remainder allocated to CSGs is distributed according to a
formula using the particular station's share of the total nonfederal income received by all
stations. The stations may use such funds for acquisition, production, and dissemination
of programming, for maintenance and development of program-related facilities, and for
development and use of broadcast technology for programming purposes. Id. § 396(k)(8).
As of fiscal 1980, the CSG "flow-through" to stations cannot be less than 50% of the CPB
appropriation. Id. § 396(k)(1)(B), (C) & (3)(A).
13. Administrative and operating expenses generally cannot exceed 5% of the dis-
bursement to CPB. Id. § 396(k)(3)(B)(iii), (C) & (D).
14. The interconnection is the satellite linkage that connects the program dissemina-
tion center to the stations. See CPB, ANNUAL REPORT 1978, at 3.
15. 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(k)(3)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1979). A "significant portion" of the
remainder, interpreted as being 25% of the CPB appropriation by fiscal 1981, is to be
allocated to national programming. H.R. REP. No. 1774, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 30, reprinted
in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5389, 5396.
16. 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(i)(1), ()(2) (West Supp. 1979).
17. See, e.g., id. § 396(I)(3)(A) (use of uniform accounting principles); id. § 396(0(3)(D)
(CPB and Comptroller General access to licensee books and records). Stations are subject
to "sunshine" and equal opportunity in employment rules. Id. §§ 396(k)(4), 398(b). In
addition, licensees cannot editorialize or endorse political candidates. Id. § 399(a).
18. See pp. 724-27 infra. In addition to its control over funding, the government is
closely involved with the selection and duties of CPB's directors. The directors are
nominated by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 47 U.S.C.A.
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CPB is prohibited from owning or operating a system of dissemina-
tion or a public telecommunications system, and from producing,
scheduling, or disseminating programs.19 In response to this restriction,
CPB established PBS, a separate nonprofit corporation with public
television station membership, to manage the interconnection system
and to schedule and distribute programs.20 PBS's autonomy is mani-
fested both by the annual election of its directors by the managers of
member stations21 and by the lack of direct financial support from
the government.22 However, although PBS is consulted as to the
programs that CPB funds, PBS's role is not significant because all
decisionmaking authority for those programs rests with CPB.2 3 PBS
does operate the satellite and telephone interconnection network
but CPB retains ultimate control of the interconnection. 2 4 PBS
§ 396(c)(1) (West Supp. 1979). Furthermore, Congress has delegated to the directors plenary
authority, particularly in the area of programming. Id. § 396(g)(2)(A)-(I). In carrying out
CPB activities, however, the directors are charged with assuring "maximum freedom"
from governmental interference with, or control of, program content. Id. § 396(g)(1)(D).
19. 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(g)(3) (West Supp. 1979).
20. Canby, The First Amendment and the State as Editor: Implications for Public
Broadcasting, 52 TEX. L. Rav. 1121, 1156 (1974).
21. See BROADCAsrINc,, July 2, 1979, at 68-69. PBS voted in 1979 to radically reorganize
itself by separating programming functions from other PBS activities, creating three
national PBS networks, and strengthening the central programming executive. See id. at
66-67; N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1979, § D, at 33-34 (station independence subordinated to
networking). Despite this reorganization, decisionmaking within each of the three PBS
"networks" is not expected to change materially. Interview with Jane Brantley, PBS
Programming Dep't, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 27, 1979) (procedures will not change,
"just different people") (notes on file with Yale Law Journal).
22. PBS derives its revenues directly from fund-raising campaigns ($32.6 million in
1978-79), contributions from private business, corporations, and foundations ($30 million),
and indirectly from the government ($21 million for specific programs from federal
agencies, $12 million from CPB). BROADCASTING, supra note 21, at 68-69.
23. The precise relationship between CPB and PBS has been troubled and remains
ambiguous. See, e.g., PUB. BROADCASTING REP., June 22, 1979, at 6 (hoping that "harmoni-
ous" relationship will replace "squabbling and bickering"); PUB. BROADCASTING REP.,
March 2, 1979, at 2 (bilateral talks necessary to resolve problems of "who does what").
Prior to a May 1973 CPB-PBS partnership agreement, CPB had sought to consolidate its
authority by forcing PBS to give CPB ultimate decisionmaking authority on support,
acquisition, acceptance, and review of programming. CPB, Resolution of the Board of
Directors (Jan. 10, 1973). PBS responded by reorganizing to consolidate its power. Negotia-
tions resulted in PBS's operation of the interconnection, the financing of programming
and advertising by its members, and increased station grants, with a decrease in funds
available to CPB for programming. See Joint Resolution of CPB and PBS (May 31, 1973).
24. Although PBS operates the interconnection, any scheduling dispute between it
and CPB is appealable to the two chairmen, whose decision is final. See Authorizations
for the Public Telecommunications Financing Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 2883 and S.
2901 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science
and Transportation, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 181 (1978) (PBS answer to subcommittee ques-
tions) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 2883]. Because ultimate authority for CPB-
funded programs is vested in CPB, the programming process can be controlled by it.
Cf. id. at 117-18 (statement of Henry Loomis, CPB president) (CPB chairman has veto
when programming decisions are appealed to two chairmen).
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also directs national program scheduling.2; Although it never ac-
tually produces a program itself,26 PBS does, however, coordinate
the Station Program Cooperative, whereby stations select programs
and pool funds for production.2 7
National programming thus is developed in three ways: by station
or entity production, through the program cooperative, or through
CPB. Most national programming is of the first type; it is either
initiated as local productions, produced by stations for national
distribution, or acquired from nonstation sources.28 The program
cooperative provides national programming by offering program pro-
posals to the stations after they are submitted to PBS for review
and evaluation in relation to overall system needs.29 CPB has re-
ceived and will continue to receive program proposals and fund
certain productions."0 The public broadcasting structure is, then,
complex and multileveled, providing numerous points at which con-
trol of programming can be exercised.
25. In Fall 1979, for example, PBS instituted a prime-time feed to its members, with a
four-night national schedule accompanied by nationwide promotion. BROADCASTING, suPra
note 21, at 73.
26. See CARNEGIE II, supra note 3, at 158.
27. See id. at 155 n.5 (describing operation of program cooperative).
28. See id. at 156.
29. See id. at 155 n.5. The PBS staff review is purely administrative and involves
preparation of an abstract of the proposal. The evaluation criteria are flexible and ex-
plicitly imprecise. See Public Broadcasting: Hearings on S. 1090 and S. 1228 Before the
Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
409-10 (1973) (criteria are relationship to needs, cost-benefit of program proposed,
originality, and experience of producer) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1090]. The
programs thus chosen are mainstream, successful, and noncontroversial. CARNEGIE II, supra
note 3, at 59-60. The program cooperative selects programs that are popular and in-
expensive, because stations are concerned with the utility of their "program dollar." H.R.
REP. No. 1178, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 34, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
5345, 5378.
30. The Public Telecommunications Financing Act of 1978 mandates that CPB fund
more programs. 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(k)(3)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1979) (reservation of "significant
portion" of appropriation for national programming). In fiscal 1978, CPB spent $19.4
million on national programming, research and development, and on piloting. CPB,
ANNUAL REPORT 1978, at 18. CPB will only fund programs through their second season.
See CARNEGIE II, supra note 3, at 157.
In 1979 the CPB board voted to reorganize CPB by establishing a semiautonomous
Program Fund in order to better insulate individual programming decisions from the
directors. The Program Fund will allocate the CPB appropriation for national program-
ming; a Management Services Division will handle nonprogramming functions. See
BROADCASTING, June 25, 1979, at 54. The CPB board will hire the Fund director and
consider the system's long- and short-term needs. The director, after the vote of the
advisory committee, will make the final individual funding decision. The CPB reorganiza-
tion, however, does not change the present analysis. CPB will continue to set priorities,
sce p. 735 infra, and will audit the Fund, see BROADCASTING, supra.
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B. CPB, PBS, and State Action
CPB and PBS will be bound by constitutional restrictions only
if they are state actors.3 ' To determine whether an entity is a state
actor, courts look to several elements of the nexus between the gov-
ernment and the institution to ascertain "whether the involvement
of the government is so interwoven" as to support a finding of state
action -.3 2 Significant factors in this determination include depen-
dence on government funding, the public nature of the function
performed, the extent and intrusiveness of the regulatory scheme,33
and the totality of the circumstances. 34 Although one federal district
court, in Network Project v. CPB,35 found no state action in the
public broadcasting structure,30 a proper application of state action
doctrine demonstrates that both CPB and PBS are governmental
bodies.37
The most significant strand of the state action nexus is that of
government funding, the element with which the Network Project
court began its analysis.38 The court analogized from cases finding
31. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349-50 (1974); The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). "State" action tests are operative at the federal as well
as state level. See, e.g., Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952).
32. There is no single test for determining whether there is state action. The decision
is reached "by sifting facts and weighing circumstances." Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). In general the state action finding depends on whether a
governmental character has become "involved" in, Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380
(1967), "insinuated" into, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961),
or "intertwin[ed]" with, Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535, 548
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), the body whose action is challenged. Governmental involvement need
not be direct. See Howard Univ. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 510 F.2d 213, 217
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (pervasive influence of state-supported universities in N.C.A.A. supports
finding that its rules constitute state action).
33. See Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 629 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 927 (1975).
34. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961) (peculiar facts
or circumstances must always be considered).
35. 4 MEDIA L. REP. 2399 (D.D.C. 1979).
36. Id. at 2403-08.
37. See pp. 725-27 infra (under nexus analysis CPB and PBS are state actors); cf.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 149 (1973)
(Douglas, J., concurring) ("difficult to see why [CPB] is not a federal agency engaged in
operating a 'press' "). But cf. Jennes, Memorandum of Law, in CARNEGIE I, supra note 9,
at 131 ("good possibility" that CPB would be a nongovernmental entity). Although a
federal statute, 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(b) (West Supp. 1979), expressly states that CPB is not
an agency or establishment of the United States, it does not preclude a state action find-
ing; it only exempts CPB from enactments applicable solely to government agencies. See,
e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1976) (defining "agencies" to which Administrative Procedure Act
applies).
This Note will not analyze CPB and PBS as state actors under the public function
theory of state action because state action can be found under the nexus theory, and thus
a showing under the public function approach is unnecessary.
38. 4 MEDIA L. REP. at 2404.
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no state action in federal aid to private educational institutions to
determine there was no state action in CPB's activities. "9 But, as
the Network Project court acknowledged, those cases arose in "dif-
ferent factual contexts" from that of CPB and PBS. 40 Unlike the
universities, which had other major sources of income, CPB is wholly
funded by federal appropriations and PBS depends on federal funds
for about one-third of its support.4 ' Moreover, PBS receives all fund-
ing for its operation of the interconnection from CPB, an involve-
ment that alone might justify a finding of state action. 42 In addi-
tion, the tax-exempt status of CPB and PBS and the allowance of
charitable deductions for contributions to them confer a government
benefit that contributes to a finding of state action. 43
In performing traditional governmental functions, CPB and PBS
satisfy as well the next state-action criterion considered by the
Network Project court. Each helps to discharge the government's
interest in fostering expression.44 Moreover, Congress has delegated
to them its discretionary power to spend government funds.45 Al-
though the court rightly distinguished cases in which the state action
finding under the public function theory was premised on the in-
volvement of racial discrimination,4 6 equally numerous cases have
employed a public function analysis in situations in which no such
discrimination had been alleged.47
Additionally, government regulation of CPB and PBS is suffi-
ciently extensive to render them state actors. Although the Network
39. See id. at 2404-05. Cases cited included Greenya v. George Vashington Univ., 512
F.2d 556, 560 (D.C. Cir. 1975) and Spark v. Catholic Univ. of America, 510 F.2d 1277, 1282
(D.C. Cir. 1975). But cf. note 43 infra (citing line of cases with contrary effect).
40. 4 MEDIA L. RE'. at 2404.
41. See note 22 sufkra.
42. See Canby, sura note 20, at 1159 (government funding of interconnection justifies
First Amendment scrutiny of PBS).
43. See Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 628 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 927 (1975) (activities of tax-exempt organizations are infused with state action);
cf. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1164-65 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem. sub nor. Coit v.
Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) (indirect government support of organization by tax exemptions
and deductions compels it to adhere to federal policy). The Network Project court did not
consider this factor in its analysis of the funding element of the nexus.
44. See note 6 supra (affirmative duty to subsidize).
45. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(g) (West Supp. 1979).
46. 4 MEDIA L. RiEr. at 2406.
47. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513-21 (1976) (analysis applied to
shopping center); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (company town performs public
function). Although the Network Project court indicated that the absence of close moni-
toring and substantial control of the delegatee's performance by the governmental body
precluded a finding that CPB performs a state function, 4 MEDIA L. REP. at 2406, it failed
to assess the relationship created by Congress's close supervision of CPB expenditures.
Such an assessment would have led to an opposite conclusion.
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Project court found that congressional control through the appropria-
tions process is minimized by a five-year authorization period,48 con-
gressional regulation and control is far more pervasive than the ap-
propriations process considered by the court. CPB was created by
Congress;4 9 its directors are political appointees50 with comprehen-
sive, statutorily delegated powers.51 It reports to Congress annually,5
and may be audited by the General Accounting Office. 5  Officers
and employees of CPB and PBS are subject to salary limitations set
by Congress.5 4 CPB enforces adherence by PBS and grant recipients
to federally mandated accounting principles5 and monitors, with
PBS, recipients' compliance with "sunshine" laws and equal op-
portunity in employment regulations, thus performing oversight func-
tions delegated directly to it by Congress.56 The statutory scheme,
therefore, not only contemplates CPB funding and content regula-
tion, but involves Congress and the executive in the administration
of the public broadcasting system. Thus all CPB activities are in-
extricably linked to, and governed by, federal statute. 57
The last element of the state action inquiry examines the "to-
tality of the circumstances"; that is, it considers whether the contacts
between CPB and the government, taken as a whole, reveal state
48. 4 MEDIA L. REP. at 2407. Actual CPB appropriations, however, occur annually.
See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 440, Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 101(g), 93 Stat. 923, 925 (appropriating
funds to CPB for fiscal 1982); Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-38,
93 Stat. 97, 110 (fiscal 1981).
49. Cf. Palmer v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 479 F.2d 153, 163 (6th Cir. 1973) (statute
empowering regulated utility makes utility state actor).
50. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(c) (West Supp. 1979); cf. p. 724 supra (many factors apposite
for state action finding).
51. See note 18 supra.
52. See note 16 supra.
53. 47 U.S.C.A. § 396()(2)(A) (West Supp. 1979).
54. 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(k)(10) (West Supp. 1979). Congress has also expressed concern as
to the salaries that PBS officials receive. See Hearings on S. 2883, supra note 24, at 81-82
(statements of Sen. Hollings and Henry Geller).
55. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(l)(3)(A) (vest Supp. 1979).
56. See id. § 398(b). The fact that CPB and PBS are the institutions charged with
overseeing compliance with the equal opportunity in employment regulations by condi-
tioning grants, obtaining information, and monitoring hiring practices supports the
argument that both entities are engaging in governmental activity.
57. The Network Project court found that the provisions of the Public Broadcasting
Act of 1967 that provide for staggered terms of directors, a bipartisan board, and absence
of political tests or qualifications in personnel actions restrict presidential control and
demonstrate the separation of CPB from political and, hence, governmental institutions.
4 MEDIA L. REP. at 2407. Provisions similar to those cited by the court for support are,
however, often found in the statutes that establish governmental agencies. See, e.g., 47
U.S.C. § 154(c) (1976) (staggered terms of FCC commissioners); id. § 154(b) (bipartisanship
required for FCC); id. § 154(f)(1) (FCC must use apolitical civil service). Thus, the
provisions demonstrate how similar CPB is to a state entity, notwithstanding the statutory
denial that it is an agency of the federal government.
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action.58 The pervasiveness of federal control through funding, ap-
pointment, and accountability, in the aggTegate, makes CPB more
like a state actor than a private entity. The opportunity for gov-
ernment intrusion is present in so many phases of its operation that
the circumstances demonstrate that it has taken on a governmental
character.
CPB, as state actor, transforms PBS as well. Both CPB and Con-
gress oversee certain PBS activities. 59 The CPB chairman's power to
decide disputes between the organizations makes the operating en-
tity the subordinate of CPB.60 Thus PBS, as an agent of CPB, 1 takes
on the governmental character of its superior. The comprehensive
scheme of continuing oversight-of congressional involvement in pub-
lic broadcasting-renders both CPB and PBS subject to First Amend-
ment doctrines.
II. Prior Restraints and Public Broadcasting
The First Amendment protects the rights of viewers, 62 broadcast-
ers,0 3 and program producers.64 The prior restraint doctrine pro-
58. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722-25 (1961).
59. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 2883, supra note 24, at 114 (remarks of Henry Loomis)
(CPB can audit PBS functions funded by CPB); id. at 137 (congressional inquiry into
PBS officials' salaries).
60. See note 24 supra (CPB ultimately controls). PBS is not, however, entirely power-
less and wholly subordinate to CPB. It can, for example, both exercise tight controls over
programming not underwritten by CPB and restrict station autonomy. See, e.g., PBS,
NATIONAL PROGRAM FUNDING STANDARDS AND PRACTICUs passim (1976) (detailed recitation of
the regulations governing underwriting, credits, promotion). Moreover, PBS approval is
required for use of the interconnection for program transmission and its operations in
this area are largely autonomous. Cf. N.Y. Times, supra note 21, at 33, col. 2 (PBS as
"traffic cop"). Although PBS program clearance can be bypassed through the satellite,
see Variety, May 30, 1979, at 64, col. 1, such use is limited and does not affect the net-
work's feed. See note 21 supra (PBS reorganization will further centralize authority); note
25 supra (PBS uniform scheduling). The fact that an institution such as PBS has powers
that are not controlled by governmental entities such as CPB or Congress does not,
however, affect a conclusion that PBS is sufficiently imbued with a governmental character
so as to be a state actor.
61. Network Project v. CPB, 4 MEDIA L. REP. 2399, 2404 (D.D.C. 1979) (court assumes,
arguendo, PBS is "agent" of CPB).
62. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (noting rights of
viewers and listeners in broadcasting).
63. The broadcaster's right to transmit the programs it alone selects has been upheld,
within the limits of FCC regulation, in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969), and Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 412 U.S. 94 (1973). See also Writers
Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1133-35 (C.D. Cal. 1976), vacated
on other grounds sub noma. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. American Broad-
casting Co., 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979) (independent decisionmaking by local licensees
is "constitutional foundation" of broadcasting system).
64. Program producers, as direct recipients of a monetary subsidy fostering speech,
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hibits government from restraining expression on the basis of a de-
termination that its content is disfavored or objectionable.0 5 Yet
the parties involved in public broadcasting are severely injured when
CPB and PBS make content-based decisions not to subsidize or dis-
seminate the programs of certain applicants. 6
Congress recognized that there would be attempts to impose prior
restraints from outside the public broadcasting system. It attempted
to insulate CPB from these external pressures through such safe-
guards 67 as CPB's autonomous corporate existence, selection of in-
dependent directors, individual station decisionmaking, and public
visibility. None of these formal safeguards, however, prevents the
system from imposing content-based prior restraints on expression,
occupy a position analogous to performers in auditoriums or speakers in public areas,
whose rights are protected. Cf. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,
554 (1975) (municipal board governing auditorium scheduling cannot review content to
determine whether applicant should be granted use of the facility).
65. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (press has general "immunity from
previous restraints"). See generally Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 648 (1955). There is a heavy presumption against the constitutionality of
any prior restraint. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975).
Although there are exceptions to the doctrine in that certain speech is unprotected, see
Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 47-49 (1961) (liberty of speech, barring
prior restraints, not absolute); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (wartime,
obscenity, incitement to violence or government overthrow create circumstances where
speech is unprotected), they are, by and large, inapplicable to public broadcasting.
66. One clear indication that parties suffer real injuries when the government makes
content-based decisions is the fact that viewers, broadcasters, and program producers
would satisfy the injury requirement to have standing to sue for redress. Significantly, the
Network Project court recognized that plaintiff-viewers and plaintiff-program producers
alleged sufficient First Amendment violations by CPB and PBS in censoring and con-
trolling the content of public broadcasting programming to satisfy the initial standing
inquiry. 4 MEDIA L. REP. 2399, 2401-02 (D.D.C. 1979). Standing ultimately was denied
because the plaintiffs could not demonstrate a causal connection between their failure to
view programs that they desired to see on public television and the challenged activities
of the defendants. The court found that even an injunction ordering funding of a pro-
gram proposal would not necessarily result in its being viewed because stations can reject
any program. This argument, however, ignores producers' complaints that the denial of
subsidy on the basis of content violates the First Amendment. CPB refusal to fund or
PBS refusal to disseminate occurs before the licensees are given the opportunity to reject
the program that might otherwise have been produced or distributed. Moreover, broad-
caster and viewer plaintiffs have a right to challenge governmental prior restraint at any
stage, even though the restraint occurs prior to the actual decision to disseminate. Al-
though there is no guarantee that programming will be broadcast even without prior
restraint, government acts of prior restraint ensure that such programs can never be
shown. Cf. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (voiding rule prohibiting lawyer
advertising despite lack of guarantee of consumer access to information).
67. Hearings on H.R. 6736, supra note 2, at 101 (remarks of Secretary Gardner)
(describing four safeguards); see Network Project v. CPB, 561 F.2d 963, 974 (D.C. Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1978) ("Congress [has] erected numerous statutory sfe-
guards against partisan abuses.").
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both through these very mechanisms and, inherently, through the
internal operation of the system's institutional components. 68
A. Statutory and External Prior Restraints
Congress never adequately considered the constitutionality of var-
ious provisions of the Public Broadcasting and Public Telecommuni-
cations Financing Acts that operate as prior restraints. Whenever
those Acts charge the directors with enforcing proscriptions on the
content of broadcast speech, or whenever CPB or PBS accedes to
external political pressure generated by the statutory structure, ex-
pression is unconstitutionally restrained. 69
1. Prohibition on Editorializing
One unconstitutional prior restraint imposed directly upon all non-
commercial educational broadcasting stations is the statutory pro-
hibition against "editorializing," or supporting or opposing any can-
didate for political office.70 Although commercial broadcasters may
editorialize,7 1 no public station can do so, even if it receives no fed-
eral assistance.72 The legislative history of the anti-editorializing pro-
vision demonstrates an intent to facilitate prior restraint-particularly
68. There is an irony, of course, in arguing that government action that results in
supporting some speech simultaneously imposes an unconstitutional burden on other
speech. The government, however, cannot violate First Amendment strictures even to
achieve admittedly desirable ends. This is particularly so when the government can
achieve those same ends through constitutional means. See pp. 744-47 infra (suggesting
ways in which support of public broadcasting can constitutionally be achieved).
69. In addition to the problems of prior restraint discussed in text, another constitu-
tional infirmity of the public broadcasting structure is that the accountability mechanisms
by which Congress supervises CPB, PBS, and licensee performance, although facially
speech-neutral, cause those entities to engage in self-censorship. This phenomenon is
known as governmental chill. See generally Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional
Law, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808, 822-29 (1969). The doctrine proscribing chill could be in-
voked to void those statutory provisions such as the annual report, directors' testimony,
the CPB audit, and the appropriations process; these facilitate government review of the
system's programming. See, e.g., 113 CONG. REc. 26391 (1967) (statement of Rep. Ander-
son) (Congress should maintain "close scrutiny" and carry out "oversight function" to
prevent CPB "misuse" of authority); Hearings on S. 1160, supra note 2, at 125 (remarks of
Sen. Hartke) (ultimate congressional power to control programming by control of the
purse strings). This Note will not, however, apply the chill doctrine to determine the
constitutionality of federal involvement in public broadcasting.
70. 47 U.S.C. § 399(a) (1976).
71. See In re Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949) (overt
editorializing not contrary to public interest).
72. 47 U.S.C. § 399(a) (1976). Because virtually all television stations receive the
minimum CSG, those broadcast licensees that receive no federal funds are primarily FM
radio stations ineligible for CPB assistance.
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to avoid commentary on politicians73-without presenting any legiti-
mate government interest to be furthered by the prohibition.7 4 The
broad language and effect of the statute further puts its constitu-
tionality in doubt.75 The anti-editorializing provision prevents public
broadcasting stations, in their role as "private journalists,"' 70 from
providing the public with the political ideas that they have a right
to receive. 77 As an absolute prior restraint on political speech, the
prohibition is unconstitutional."
2. Objectivity and Balance Standard
The statutory requirement demanding "strict adherence to objec-
tivity and balance" in all "controversial" programs70 also authorizes
an unconstitutional prior restraint on programming. In Accuracy in
Media, Inc. v. FCC,8 0 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
73. See, e.g., 113 CONG. REc. 26391 (1967) (Rep. Joelson) ("a public official is a sitting
duck ... [t]herefore, the right of editorializing should be very, very carefully scrutinized");
Lindsey, Public Broadcasting: Editorial Restraints and the First Amendment, 28 FED. COM.
B.J. 63, 79-82 (1975) (arguing from legislative history that purpose of § 399(a) was to
prevent criticism of government).
74. The only legitimate congressional purpose that could be furthered is oversight of
the public broadcasting system. But, this goal is not possible under the absolute ban
now imposed, because the speech is never broadcast and thus cannot be reviewed.
75. Even if the interest is one of preventing public perception that a station supports
an individual or program solely because of the influence of government funds, the
provision is too overbroad to withstand scrutiny. Cf. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S.
611 (1971) (statute unconstitutionally broad if it proscribes constitutionally protected
conduct). It prohibits constitutionally permitted activity without furthering the arguably
legitimate interest. First, it includes those stations that receive no government funds and
are wholly private. See p. 729 supra. Second, the term "editorializing," used in the
statute, lends itself to wide disparity in interpretation and enforcement by CPB board
members and, consequently, is vague and overbroad. See generally Note, The First Amend-
ment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844, 856-57 (1970). Finally, it does not
allow broadcasting stations to comment on matters entirely local, such as zoning, which
are unrelated to federal, or even state, support, and hence, to the asserted interest. Cf.
Kamenshine, supra note 6, at 1144 (fairness doctrine and "equal time" provisions make
§ 399(a) superfluous in eliminating political establishment effect of funding).
76. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110-
11 (1973) (broadcaster has journalistic discretion, balanced against public trusteeship).
77. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (right of public
to receive ideas).
78. Cf. S. REP. No. 222, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 11, reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1772, 1775, 1782 (government should "in no way" be involved in program-
ming and stations must remain "absolutely free" in their decisionmaking). One public
interest group has sued to invalidate § 399(a) for denying viewers access to editorials and
depriving noncommercial broadcasters of the right to editorialize exercised by commercial
broadcasters. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, at 4, 5, League of Women
Voters of Cal. v. FCC, No. 79-1562 (C.D. Cal., filed April 30, 1979). The FCC and the
Justice Department have indicated that they will not defend the provision, agreeing with
plaintiffs' contention that § 399(a) is unconstitutional; Congress itself must determine
whether it desires to contest the action. BROADCAsTING, Nov. 19, 1979, at 72.
79. 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(g)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1979).
80. 521 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976).
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Circuit held that CPB, and not the Federal Communications Com-
mission, was responsible for enforcing the objectivity and balance
standard..' Interpretation and application of the provision thus was
left to the CPB directors and to Congress in its supervisory capacity.82
Although government cannot constitutionally interfere with expres-
sion on the basis of content, 3 enforcement of the objectivity and
balance standard by CPB necessarily involves government discipline
of speakers on the basis of the content of the speech they seek to
disseminate.' 4 Such decisionmaking effectively prevents program pro-
duction, restrains licensee discretion, and precludes expression from
being viewed, if CPB determines, prior to broadcast, that a program
fails to meet the standard. The provision thus constitutes an un-
constitutional prior restraint.8 5
3. CPB Board Appointment Process and Membership
The political mode of appointment to the board and the par-
tisanship requirement facilitate both prior restraints originating from
without CPB and internal prior restraints by encouraging directors
81. Id. at 297. Although the standard is merely "hortatory," see Hearings on S. 2883,
supra note 24, at 130, CPB acknowledges that it can use its enforcement as a justification
for prior restraint, having conceded earlier that its judgment can be exercised only "from
a personal point of view," Financing for Public Broadcasting-1972: Hearings on H.R.
11807, H.R. 7443, and H.R. 12808 Before the Subcomm. on Communications and Power
of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1972)
(statement of Frank Pace, chairman, CPB) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 11807].
82. 521 F.2d at 297. The Accuracy in Media court held that CPB may apply the
standard to individual licensees. Id. at 296 n.40. A subsequent judicial reading of the
standard has suggested that Congress can directly supervise CPB performance in its
content-oversight. See Community-Serv. Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102, 1142
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (Leventhal, J., dissenting). The Community-Service Broadcasting court
discussed CPB's "balance and objectivity" function without any explicit declaration re-
garding its constitutionality.
83. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 554 (1975). But see Com-
munity-Serv. Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Leventhal,
J., dissenting) (Congress can act to minimize partisan perspectives in federally funded
programs through facially neutral standard).
84. See Hearings on H.R. 11807, supra note 81, at 81 (statement of Frank Pace) (CPB
refusal to fund offending producers).
85. Enforcement of the standard by either CPB or PBS is a prior restraint. If either
institution disagrees with the other's assessment of a program's balance or objectivity, the
matter is referred to a "monitoring committee" composed of three trustees from each
body, with a vote of four trustees being necessary to bar a program from the in-
terconnection. See Hearings on S. 2883, supra note 24, at 181. Moreover, when applied to
"programs or series of programs," 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(g)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1979), the stan-
dard may prevent a specific program from being broadcast, not because its intrinsic mes-
sage is objectionable, but solely because too many other programs have expressed similar
sentiments such that the funding or distribution of that individual program would create
an imbalance. See H.R. RaP. No. 794, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 13, rePrinted in [1967] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1834, 1836 (each program in a series need not be objective and
balanced but the entire series, considered as a whole, must).
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to manifest their content-biases in their decisionmaking. The CPB
directors are selected on the basis of their political affiliation.86
Thus, the President can severely restrict the range of national pro-
gramming by appointing individuals whose preferences complement
his political goals and attitudes.8 7 The process has become politi-
cized to such an extent that the directors, beholden to those who
appointed them, subjectively incorporate presidential and congres-
sional preferences into their decisionmaking. 8  Those programming
decisions by political appointees can effect structural prior restraints.
The statute's mandate for bipartisan composition of the CPB board
encourages both prior restraints that originate outside CPB and those
that are internal. Independents and members of third parties effec-
tively are precluded from serving as directors because they will not
be appointed by the partisan political branches; the views of those
individuals therefore are excluded from CPB decisionmaking and
hence from public television programming. Moreover, because board
members are denominated by political affiliation, political differences
are exacerbated by encouraging awareness of directors' political pref-
erences; the resulting factionalism fosters political manipulation of
programming preferences. 9 The bipartisanship provision thus leads
to unconstitutional prior restraints.90
86. See, e.g., NATIONAL A5S'N OF EDUCATIONAL BROADCASTERS, THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION
PUBLIC BROADCASTING PAPERS 1969-1974, at 15 (1979) (1970 Whitehead memo noted that
"We can name five Republicans without overbalancing the Board politically") [herein-
after cited as NIXON PAPERS].
87. See id. at 15 (1970 Whitehead memo indicated that board is "one of our primary
levers" for assuring that CPB programming does not get "overly biased").
88. Directors are clearly tied to the Administration that nominated them. See, e.g., id.
at 41-42, 46 (Whitehead described board appointees as "loyal friends" who can control
CPB and "fire the current staff who make the grants"); id. at 62-64 (board member co-
operated with Administration by channeling information to White House). They also are
accountable to the Congress that approved their nominations. See 113 CONG. REC. 13003
(1967) (statement of Sen. Cotton) (if slant, bias, or injustice is apparent, Congress can
make directors "uncomfortable" and "shut down" appropriations to CPB). Congress and
the Executive have acted individually and in concert to inject politics into the selection
process. See, e.g., NIXON PAPERS, sukra note 86, at 18 (Whitehead recommends black
nominee as "wiser political choice"); id. at 42 (senator forced reappointment of "known
left-winger" over Administration opposition as "price of confirming" Nixon nominees).
Although there has been no attempt to transform the nomination process into a political
contest since the Nixon Administration, the structure has not changed.
89. Directors, aware that they were selected, in part, because of their political beliefs,
may feel obligated to attempt to implement such preferences. See, e.g., NIXON PAPERS,
supra note 86, at 46 (Nixon appointees "loyal" because they make their political views
known on board).
90. The constitutionality of the CPB bipartisanship requirement is more doubtful
than that of an independent government agency such as the FCC because congressional
intent and the nature of the funding activity make clear that injection of politics into
the CPB decisionmaking structure renders impossible the requisite apolitical, principled,
institutional program selection.
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4. External Political Pressure
In attempting to reconcile the desired accountability for federal
funds with the evident need for insulation from government inter-
ference, Congress created a structure uniquely vulnerable to po-
litical interference. Government officials can exercise direct prior
restraints by inducing CPB or PBS to withdraw support for propos-
als or to bar access to the interconnection-"' Because these prior re-
straints prevent producers' programs from ever being produced, broad-
cast, or viewed, they violate the First Amendment.
B. Structural Prior Restraints-Funding and Dissemination
Congress also failed to consider the structural prior restraint im-
posed by the system when CPB, or its Program Fund, decides not
to support a particular proposal, when CPB or PBS makes content-
oriented decisions to foster certain kinds of programming to the
91. See, e.g., NIXON PAPERS, supra note 86, at 41 (October 1971 White House memo
indicating that "President's basic objective" was "to get the left-wing commentators who
are cutting us up off public television at once, indeed yesterday if possible"). The Nixon
Administration attempted to influence CPB programming on a broad scale and asserted
that federal funds should not be used either to support directly anti-Administration pro-
gramming or to aid organizations that produced such programs with nonfederal funds.
The signal event in the Nixon Administration's efforts to manipulate the public broad-
casting system was the President's veto of a long-range financing bill for CPB. It was
clear that that action conveyed the Administration's message that funding would be
opposed until more favorable programming was broadcast. See Washington Post, Feb. 3,
1972, § B, at 12, col. I (Clay Whitehead, Director, Office of Telecommunications Policy,
warned that concentrating on controversial programming increased "the danger of
provoking control through the public process"); N.Y. Times, June 10, 1974, at 63, col. 3
(Whitehead proposed "deal" that funding would be exchanged for balanced programming).
The Nixon Administration also sought to instigate public pressure. See NIxoN PAPERS,
supra note 86, at 48-49 (November 1971 memo from Whitehead to H.R. Haldeman ex-
plained that Administration concern with liberal bias of certain commentators had been
dealt with by planting ideas with trade press as to their adverse effect on public tele-
vision, by encouraging speculation as to their salaries, by soliciting articles critical of
salaries, and by encouraging station manager pressure on CPB and others to balance
programming). Even though some of the external pressures on CPB from that Ad-
ministration might be attributable to the individuals involved, it is the institutional
structure of the system that encourages prior restraint. Senator Goldwater, for example,
has argued that the Carter Administration has attempted to use its connections with
CPB to influence programming. See PUB. BROADCASTING REP., June 8, 1979, at 3; PuB.
BROADCASTING REP., March 2, 1979, at 6.
Congressmen, too, have attempted to control programming. See, e.g., PUB. BROADCASTING
REP., March 16, 1979, at 6 (Rep. McCormack threatens closer look at public television for
refusing congressional preview of controversial program). The safeguard of public visibility,
relied upon by the Public Broadcasting Act's sponsors, is therefore ineffective because the
congressmen charged with transmitting citizen displeasure to CPB exacerbate the political
pressures placed on the structure. Ironically, one commentator asserted that the possibility
of political pressures on CPB was a strength of the current system, not a weakness. Hear-
ings on H.R. 6736, supra note 2, at 355 (remarks of John Kiermaier, president, Eastern
Educational Network) (citizen complaints and congressional pressure correct problem of
CPB issuing grants only to those who conform to CPB's ideas).
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detriment of others, or when PBS bars a program from the inter-
connection. - These decisions constitute prior restraints on indi-
vidual programs93 even though CPB and PBS, by their denial, are
facilitating expression of other applicants. Moreover, traditional ra-
tionales for government regulation of the content of broadcast speech,
based on increasing the overall variety of expression disseminated,
94
are inapplicable to a process that selects one program over another
for funding or dissemination.9"
1. Funding Decisions
The content-based decisions by CPB to withhold funding from
program producers are unconstitutional prior restraints because the
proposed programs are never produced, let alone distributed, or
viewed.96 Although CPB's financial control has never resulted in dom-
92. Although station choice assures that government cannot compel the broadcast of
particular programs, it is an ineffective safeguard against the restriction of expression
because the structural prior restraint occurs before the progams are placed on the inter-
connection for national distribution.
93. These restraints are not as obvious as attempts to enjoin publication. See, e.g.,
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (unconstitutionality of
injunctive prior restraint). The fact of their subtlety, however, makes them no less an
unconstitutional prior restraint on expression. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (devices to limit expression do not have to "fall into
familiar or traditional patterns"); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960)
(expression protected from "subtle governmental interference"). Perhaps because the
results of such structural restraints are apparent only in the omission of certain pro-
gramming from the interconnection and are, therefore, imperceptible to the viewer, the
First Amendment violations are even more insidious than the readily perceived, remedi-
able restraints of an injunction. But cf. Canby, supra note 20, at 1158 (CPB exercise of
funding authority raises no First Amendment problems).
94. Supervision by the FCC over content is permissible only when it expands the
variety of expression. The FCC regulates content by enforcing the equal opportunity to
reply provision and the Fairness Doctrine. See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1976). Such regulation may
be justified in that it increases the number and variety of viewpoints broadcast. Cf.
Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 1976),
vacated on other grounds sub non. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. American
Broadcasting Co., 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979) (content regulation permitted only if
diversity promoted). The FCC must avoid prescribing the particular speech suitable for
broadcast. See Commission en banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2310 (1960)
(FCC cannot review program content, with only exceptions being obscenity, profanity, in-
decency, and programs inciting to riot or inducing commission of crime).
95. Unlike generic selection of programming, such as promoting "opposition views,"
CPB and PBS scrutiny and approval or disapproval of particular programs that results
in the funding of one individual program over one other program where both programs
would each increase equally the diversity of programming, does not increase the overall
diversity of all broadcast expression.
96. It might be asserted that because there is a potential for alternative funding
sources for programming, CPB can constitutionally perform its content-selective function.
That assertion fails on both constitutional and factual bases. Speech may not be abridged
by denying a subsidy in one place merely because the expression can be subsidized in
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ination by an "official government view,"97 and although direct CPB
censorship of completed programs is rare,98 the CPB funding pro-
cedure depends entirely on the appeal that the content of the proposed
production has for the directors. CPB selection of proposals for produc-
tion, therefore, is based on the directors' subjective determinations that
the proposal conforms to their sense of the meritorious.
At each stage of the proposal approval process, CPB officials make
content-based determinations that prevent certain acts of expression
from being created. 99 The 1979 CPB reorganization, establishing the
Program Fund in order to separate directors from individual pro-
gramming decisions, 00 does not alter the conclusion that CPB fund-
ing decisions are prior restraints. The CPB board will continue to
make policy decisions and to set priorities for categories of pro-
gramming; categorization works as an unconstitutional restraint on
expression when, for example, it precludes funding for producing a
particular public affairs program because the board has decided there
is already a surfeit of programs of that type. 101 Furthermore, even
some other place. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975)
(fact private auditorium is available is constitutionally irrelevant when city denies use of
public auditorium to speaker); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) (refusal to
allow speaker's entry to proper public place cannot be justified on plea that such speech
may be exercised elsewhere). Thus, the existence of private alternatives, whether they be
corporate underwriters or commercial networks, cannot justify CPB decisions to withhold
funding from an applicant on the basis of content.
Furthermore, Congress has determined that no alternatives to congressional support
for public television programming do, in fact, exist. CPB funding for pilots and for
program development is not replicated by corporate sponsors or by commercial networks.
This is, for example, particularly true of CPB subsidies to independent producers, who
generally have been unable to tap other sources of funding. See Hearings on S. 2883, supra
note 24, at 380-81, 394 (independent producers, outside system, have problems obtaining
money).
97. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 595 U.S. 367, 396 (1969).
98. When censorship does occur, it is usually indirect, taking the form of rejecting
story ideas or using technical problems as an excuse. See Feedback 3: The Fourth Net-
work, PERFORMANCE, Sept./Oct. 1972, at 124, 131 (subtle censorship in pre-production
conferences).
99. CPB's statutory authority to make decisions based on the content of the proposal
or program is found in the activities section of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, 47
U.S.C.A. § 396(g)(2) (West Supp. 1979). CPB is charged with fostering programs of "high
quality," "diversity," and "excellence." Id. § 396(g)(1)(A). The board carries out the
statutory mandate by setting priorities for the system, by category, after assessing the
needs of the system and the public and examining future requirements. Hearings on S.
2883, supra note 24, at 236-47.
100. See note 30 supra.
101. The Nixon Administration attempted to eliminate public affairs programming
from the system. See NixoN PAPERS, supra note 86, at 61-62. Its success can be measured
by the termination of "Firing Line" and Bill Moyers's "Journal" during that Administra-
tion. In addition, the National Public Affairs Center for Television budget was so severely
cut that the Center eventually disappeared. See WASHINGTON JOUR. Rav., April/May 1979,
at 38.
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after the reorganization, the Program Fund director must adhere to
the policies and priorities promulgated by the CPB directors in mak-
ing individual determinations. 10 2
In making these funding decisions, CPB violates the constitutional
requirement that limited government resources must be allocated in
accordance with objective'0 3 and well-defined regulations, 04 and that
governmental discretion must be bounded by "precise and clear"
standards. 05 Expenditures for the erection of buildings that are in-
tended to make speech more accessible to the public 16 and expendi-
tures for the ancillary uses of parks, streets, and other open places
as forums for expression 07 are government subsidies that can be
allocated on the basis of objective criteria. 08  No such criteria are
possible, however, when the subsidy is inherently dependent on a
content-based determination. 0 9
CPB funding determinations are not bounded by precise limita-
tions." 0 CPB programming decisions, which bar expression from be-
102. See PUB. BROADCASTING REP., June 22, 1979, at 9 (director, nominated by CPB
president, appointed by board, required to follow board policy). The model adopted for
the Fund considerably lessened the Fund's insulation, as compared to the proposal
originally contemplated. Cf. PUB. BROADCASTING REP., May 25, 1979, at 3 (original plan
for Fund).
103. Courts hold that decisions concerning allocation of subsidies cannot be based
on a subjective evaluation of the content of expression because government would be
given unconstitutional license to mold the substance of the expression. See, e.g., South-
eastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975) (public officials cannot
engage in content review); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1337 (D. Mass.
1970) (state college administrator cannot determine content of state-funded newspaper).
104. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969) (parade
ordinance must employ "narrow, objective, and definite standards").
105. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975) (standard
applied to use of municipal auditoriums); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272
(1951) (requiring limits on discretionary authority of officials to grant permits to use
public parks).
106. See, e.g., John F. Kennedy Center Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 76h-76q (1976) (establishing
John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts); Act of Oct. 15, 1966, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 284-284b (1976) (establishing Wolf Trap Farm Park).
107. Through the processing of parade permits, the administration of licensing or-
dinances, and the provision of police protection, government allocates its resources to
facilitate and subsidize expression in areas primarily designed for recreation, traffic, or
other public uses.
108. Government can constitutionally control us- when a situs can only be physi-
cally occupied by one speaker at any one time. It could do so on a first-come-first-
served or lowest-cost-to-the-community basis. Moreover, physical barriers and regula-
tions authorized by the police power are justifications for limiting and allocating usage.
109. CPB and PBS funding decisions are based on standards that are inherently
imprecise and demand subjectivity. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(g)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1979) (CPB
to facilitate programs of "excellence"); id. § 396(g)(2)(B)(i) (proposals evaluated on basis
of "comparative merit").
110. In fact, there are no limits on CPB discretion. Cf. Hearings on S. 1090, suPra
note 29, at 36 (remarks of Thomas Curtis, chairman, CPB) (noting plenary CPB
responsibility for spending federal funds).
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ing created, broadcast, or viewed, are made without constitutionally
required guidelines or standards. Although it would be possible for
CPB and PBS to allocate on constitutionally permissible, objective
grounds, not based on comparisons of content,"' the congressional
goal of fostering the most meritorious, highest quality, expression
would thereby be vitiated. Because the Public Broadcasting Act of
1967 mandates that CPB-PBS inquiries be content-specific, it is
unconstitutional.
PBS funding procedures parallel the CPB process and similarly
constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. PBS's gen-
eral production guidelines warn that producing entities, and PBS,
must be cognizant of and concerned with "taste""-' and "contro-
versial and adult themes""x 3 and that any problems in these ambig-
uous areas must be resolved by adapting to community standards ." 4
PBS enforces these guidelines by preparing reports on problem pro-
ducers and by levying penalties for such breaches of the production
agreement as a failure to comply with PBS programming standards." 3
Implementation of these vague and imprecise production criteria and
the threat of lost future funding restrict program production and
broadcast.
PBS's content-oriented decisionmaking process also facilitates un-
constitutional preclusion of proposals and programming from the
system. The procedure involves four elements: assessment of na-
tional program needs, receipt and evaluation of program proposals
and ideas, establishment of priority projects, and recommendations
for financing." This multistage selection process makes possible
proposal or program exclusion at each level of approval. Because
PBS decisionmakers use "all sorts of subjective criteria,""17 indi-
111. See note 108 supra (content-neutral allocation schemes).
112. See PBS, PROGRAM STANDARDS AND PRacricEs 7 (June 1972) [hereinafter cited as
STANDARDS AND PRacrxcas]. These areas are, PBS admits, "ill-defined." Id. They do not
meet First Amendment requirements of precision. See p. 736 supra.
113. STANDARDS AND PRACTICEs, supra note 112, at 9.
114. Id. at 11. PBS suggests production "of alternative versions of a program." Id.
Another option is "flagging" a particular program so as to notify a station that it may
be controversial. See, e.g., PUB. BROADCASTING REP., Nov. 24, 1978, at 6. PBS's Pro-
gramming Committee recently advised producers that "programs using language and
material unsuitable for broadcast in some communities" were being produced, and
that it might have to examine its "standards and practices policy to see if further
steps such as the development of a code of programming practices will be necessary"
because production entities judge differently "whether or not such language and ma-
terial is gratuitous." d.
115. See Hearings on S. 1090, supra note 29, at 418, 420-21.
116. See Hearings on S. 2883, supra note 24, at 374-78.
117. Interview, supra note 21; see Hearings on S. 2883, supra note 24, at 378 (re-
marks of Lawrence Grossman) (discretion and latitude of PBS programming staff in
making individual recommendations and choices).
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vidual programs may never be broadcast or received by the viewer
if they meet with official PBS disfavor.118 It is the use of such sub-
jectivity in resource allocation that makes the PBS funding pro-
cedure an unconstitutional prior restraint.'"
2. Dissemination Decisions
The interconnection is necessarily limited by capacity and by
finite broadcast hours. Nonetheless, in operating the interconnection,
PBS makes subjective, content-based decisions that therefore consti-
tute prior restraints 20 on producers whose programs cannot be dis-
tributed, broadcasters who cannot transmit those programs, and view-
ers who are unable to view them. 21
118. Even programs completed under PBS supervision are reviewed by PBS for
"timing and content" prior to distribution. See Hearings on S. 1090, supra note 29,
at 419-20.
119. The allocation problem arises whenever the resource is finite, whether due
to the limited funds available for public broadcasting, or to the physical limitations
of an auditorium. In wholly content-neutral inquiries, however, the process is con-
stitutional because it denies a subsidy to the applicant or user solely for reasons that
are unrelated to the content of the expression. The CPB and PBS procedures, which
compare program proposals to determine their relative merits, are unconstitutional
because they inextricably link the disfavored content of the expression seeking funding
to a decision to allocate elsewhere; the justification for withholding the subsidy is
grounded solely on the content of the proposal or program.
120. Some programs have been entirely withdrawn from the interconnection be-
cause PBS believed that their content would be objectionable to local stations. STAN-
DARDS AND PRAcTicES, supra note 112, at 12 (programs withdrawn available on indi-
vidual station request); see F. POWLEDGE, PUBLIC TELEVISION: A QUEsTIoN OF SURVIVAL
45-46 (1972) ("The Politics of Woody Allen," having escaped pre-production scrutiny,
withdrawn after objections were made known to its producer); N.Y. Times, March 2,
1974, at 63, col. 3 ("Steambath," a play with semi-nudity and blasphemy, not dis-
tributed by PBS nationally). PBS content-selectivity in accepting programs for dis-
semination over the interconnection cannot be justified on the ground that alternatives
exist for airing programs barred by PBS. See note 96 suPra (discussing constitutional
irrelevance of alternatives argument). As a factual matter, commercial networks gen-
erally do not transmit nationally unsolicited programs that they had no part in pro-
ducing, such as those created by public telecommunications entities. There is thus no
alternative interconnection for public television programming to that operated by PBS.
121. Barring a program from the interconnection might also be analyzed as an
unconstitutional denial of access to a public forum. Cf. Chase, Public Broadcasting
and the Problem of Government Influence: Towards a Legislative Solution, 9 U.
MicH. J.L. REF. 62 (1975) (describing public broadcasting system as public forum).
The public forum doctrine prohibits the government from using content as a basis for
restricting use of areas set aside to facilitate expression. See Police Dep't of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (government cannot selectively exclude from forum on
content bases). Access can be restricted only on objective, content-neutral grounds. See
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941). The Network Project v. CPB court im-
precisely declared that "public television" as a whole does not constitute a public forum. 4
MEDIA L. REP. 2399, 2409 (D.D.C. 1979). Nevertheless, the CPB-funded and PBS-operated
interconnection meets public forum criteria. Cf. Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d 83,
89 (2d Cir. 1968) (determinative factors include character, pattern of usual activity, nature
of essential purpose, and population of place); 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(g)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1979)
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Prior restraint by PBS occurs when it distributes a program at a
less-desirable time or delays a program's release. 122 In editing pro-
grams, PBS inevitably prevents portions of programs from being
viewed. 12 3 Moreover, PBS has directly interfered with the autonomy
of individual stations, by dictating to licensees when they are to
broadcast programming distributed over the interconnection. 24 Like-
wise, CPB has exercised control over the interconnection that un-
dermined licensee autonomy.12 5 Because CPB and PBS dissemina-
tion decisions inherently involve content-based determinations as to
the allocation of a scarce resource, they constitute prohibited prior
restraints on those programs not subsidized.12
(interconnection is for use of all public telecommunications entities to disseminate their
services); id. § 396(h)(2) (interconnection made available to others for noncommercial pro-
gramming whenever there is sufficient capacity). See also Comment, supra note 6, at 1437-
60 (arguing that public forum analysis should be applied to media owned by govern-
ments, e.g., state public television stations, to reconcile competing interests of public
access and editorial discretion).
Prior restraint analysis, however, subsumes the public forum doctrine because it con-
cludes that all content-based allocations of any type of subsidy, direct monetary support,
or expenditures for ancillary use of public forums, are unconstitutional. Cf. South-
eastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553-54 (1975) (declaration that city
cannot exercise "prior restraint" in barring access to the public forum of its audi-
torium on content-based grounds). Thus, whenever CPB or PBS acts to bar expression
from the interconnection, to deny a producer access to a public forum, it is engaging
in an unconstitutional prior restraint.
122. See, e.g., F. PowLEtCE, supra note 120, at 39-43 (broadcast of segment of "Great
American Dream Machine" on FBI informants delayed after FBI objections and producer's
refusal to supply substitute to PBS).
123. See, e.g., id. (segment of "Great American Dream Machine" deleted from inter-
connection, ultimately broadcast in context of locally produced panel discussion on media
controversies). A CPB board member kept the Nixon Administration informed as to the
status of the segment by sending a memo to Clay Whitehead. See NIXON PAPERs, supra
note 86, at 43.
124. PBS made a special exception to its normal policy when it required all stations
to broadcast WETA's program of Vladimir Horowitz at the White House at the time
of the feed if they wanted to use it thereafter. Telegram, From PBS Scheduling, To
PTV Stations (Feb. 15, 1978), reprinted in Hearings on S. 2883, supra note 24, at 406.
125. CPB has overridden PBS operation of the interconnection to transmit programs
directly to the stations. See Hearings on S. 1090, supra note 29, at 182 (statement of
Gregory Knox). Although CPB does not regularly do so, its control is a structural pos-
sibility that makes it a potential violator of the constitutional prohibition on prior
restraints in dissemination decisions. CPB power over the interconnection arises because
all direct and indirect costs of maintaining and operating the interconnection system
are covered under an annual PBS contract with CPB. PBS, FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 1978
AND 1977, at note 4.
126. Inherently content-based determinations are also present in the disbursement
of government funds for artistic and literary speech to the National Endowments for
the Arts and the Humanities (NEA/NEH), a program substantially similar to CPB.
See National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-209, 79 Stat. 846 (1965), as amended by the Arts, Humanities and Cultural Affairs
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-462, §§ 101-106, 90 Stat. 1971 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 951-
960 (1976)); ef. N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1979, § D, at 42, cols. 1-2 (controversy over NEH
denial of funding to television film producer, based on experts' literary judgment,
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3. The Inapplicability of Judicial Exceptions that Permit Content-
Based Inquiries
Courts have recognized two situations in which the First Amend-
ment permits subjective, content-specific allocation of a subsidy so
that considerations of prior restraint never arise: restrictions by
theme and the proprietary editorial privilege. Neither exception
applies to, or justifies, CPB or PBS decisionmaking.
First, government may limit a subsidy for expression to applicants
who will conform to a designated topic.1 27 The limitation depends
upon the type, or theme, of the expression. The state, therefore,
may conduct a narrowly circumscribed inquiry into the content of
the proposed expression to ascertain whether it is of the type the
government intends to foster through the particular subsidy program.
This exception to the prohibition on content-specific inquiries is
inapplicable to public broadcasting because Congress specifically has
although proposal was submitted to regular system of review); Note, Tax Treatment
of Artists' Charitable Contributions, 89 YALE L.J. 144, 154 n.30 (1979) (discussing
criticism of officials' content-based funding determinations). In Advocates for the Arts
v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 797 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976), the court
held that because the standard of "artistic merit" guiding the distribution of NEA
funds could not be transformed into objective criteria, the decisions to award direct
monetary subsidies did not have to comply with the First Amendment requirement
of precise, content-neutral, resource allocation. Moreover, although the court averred
that there is no "tradition of absolute neutrality in public subsidization of activities
involving speech," id. at 796, it gave scant consideration to the well-established content-
neutrality requirement. See p. 736 & notes 103 & 104 supra (content-selection by objective
criteria). The First Amendment requires, however, that subsidy programs such as those
at issue in Advocates for the Arts and public broadcasting, which inherently and ir-
remediably preclude expression from being created because of its content, either meet
constitutional requirements or be found unconstitutional.
Direct grants for scientific research through programs such as the National Science
Foundation (NSF) are distinguishable from subsidies for expression because NSF in-
quires into the nature of the research, not into the content of the scientific expression that
ultimately may be disseminated. Government is concerned with subsidizing scientific in-
vestigation and obtaining information, not with the promulgation of expression for its own
sake-the content of any consequent expression is not the object of the subsidy. See 42
U.S.C. § 1862(a)(1)-(7) (1976) (purpose of NSF program is research and scientific develop-
ment).
The selection of books for purchase by government libraries is also distinguishable
from direct, content-based, subsidies. First, libraries often use objective criteria-pur-
chasing all of a particular publisher's publications, for example-in allocating their
funds. Second, libraries may be imbued with the right of academic freedom that permits
content-selectivity. Cf. p. 741 infra (entity with First Amendment, free press "editorial
privilege," can be content-selective).
127. See, e.g., Toward a Gayer Bicentennial Comm. v. Rhode Island Bicentennial
Foundation, 417 F. Supp. 632, 639 & n.9 (D.R.I. 1976) (state can inquire as to whether
applicant's proposed use of public area comports with theme specified by government);
cf. note 121 supra (content-based denial of access to a subsidized public forum as prior
restraint).
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indicated that program funding and the interconnection are not to
be allocated to facilitate the expression of any particular type of
speech. 12
The second exception allows government to engage in content-
based selection when it operates, as proprietor, an entity vested with
free press rights. 12 9 In the electronic media, only the broadcast li-
censees, and no other entity, have such an editorial privilege. 30
CPB simply allocates the funding subsidy, performing none of the
traditional press functions involved in disseminating expression di-
rectly to the public. 13' Moreover, in regulating access to the intercon-
nection, neither CPB nor PBS is functioning as an entity of the
press.13 2 Thus neither entity has a constitutional privilege to make
an editorial decision to deny a subsidy on the basis of content.133
128. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(g)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1979) (CPB to obtain programs "of
high quality, diversity, creativity, excellence, and innovation . . . from diverse sources").
CPB's categorization of program proposals is, therefore, not an exception to the pro-
hibition on non-content-neutral decisionmaking but is actually contrary to congressional
intent as manifested in the Act.
129. See Avins v. Rutgers, State Univ. of N.J., 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968) (state university law review had editorial prerogative of
rejecting article); cf. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064,
1133 (C.D. Cal. 1976), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Writers Guild of America,
West, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979) (government acts
as editor when it delivers expression directly to the public via, e.g., public school
newspapers and radio and television stations); Canby, supra note 20 (analysis of public
broadcasting system in state-as-editor framework); Comment, supra note 6, at 1439-46
(discussing editorial function in media owned by state).
130. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
117 (1973) (licensee is analogous to private newspaper with "large measure of journalistic
freedom"); Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1134
(C.D. Cal. 1976), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Writers Guild of America, West,
Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979) (editorial discretion
afforded to broadcast licensees).
131. CPB is forbidden to produce programs or own or operate licensees. See p. 722
supra. CPB, therefore, neither speaks nor disseminates and is solely a funder for
other entities that will perform a press function.
132. The interconnection does not disseminate directly to the people; its feed is
always subject to the filtration of the editorial discretion of the licensee. It is not,
therefore, a "press," defined as being an immediate source of information to the public.
Cf. Comment, Problems in Defining the Institutional Status of the Press, 11 U. RIcH.
L. REV. 177, 183 (1976) (the "press" is the means for individuals to "exercise their
right to receive").
133. This editorial privilege is grounded in the First Amendment guarantee of a
free press. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (First
Amendment guarantees free press editorial function protection from intrusion). It is
distinguishable from the occasional description of the function performed by the al-
locator of a direct subsidy as "editorial" selection. See, e.g., Network Project v. CPB,
4 MEDIA L. REP. 2399, 2409 (D.D.C. 1979) (CPB makes "editorial" decisions in de-
termining which programs to fund). In direct subsidy cases the word "editorial" simply
refers to the process of content-selection and not to the constitutional right inhering in
the press; its incantation does not, therefore, carry with it the constitutional exception
to the prohibition on content-based decisionmaking.
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III. Severing the Nexus-A Constitutional Restructuring
of the Public Broadcasting System
The constitutional problems raised by the current structure of the
public broadcasting system can be avoided only if the state action
nexus between the system and the government is severed. Once CPB
and PBS become entirely private actors, they will not have to satisfy
First Amendment proscriptions against content-based government de-
cisions concerning expression. 134 Although one option would be to
terminate all federal funding for public broadcasting, the system
would then collapse, unable to generate sufficient financial support. 13U
Severing the state action nexus by less radical reform is a preferable
solution because it eliminates the First Amendment problems of the
current system while allowing the limited federal involvement necessary
to meet future revenue requirements.
3 6
A. Restructuring CPB-Carnegie H Solutions and Beyond
Carnegie II suggested several changes in the structure of the public
broadcasting system that would increase the insulation of CPB and
PBS decisional processes from government control. Recognizing that
the political character of the board results from the method of se-
lecting directors, 37 Carnegie II recommended that presidential ap-
134. CPB and PBS could, as private entities, then enforce adherence to any non-
governmental balance and objectivity standard, or any prohibition on editorializing,
and could select programs for funding and dissemination on the basis of content. The
suggestions of this Note would not affect the status of broadcast licensees. Those non-
commercial stations that are affiliated with state universities might, of their own
accord, be designated state actors because of their particular ties to the state. All
licensees would retain their editorial rights to select programs for broadcast. See note
130 supra. But see Comment, supra note 6, at 1455-57 (accommodate competing in-
terests by balancing editorial discretion with right of access to state-owned media forums).
135. See CARNEGIE II, supra note 3, at 118-27, 136 (federal support must be 40% of
$1.16 billion total revenue requirements of public telecommunications entities in 1985).
Another option would be for Congress to appropriate a one-time lump sum to a
private entity, carte blanche, for the development of public broadcasting programming.
The legislative history of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 makes it clear that this
alternative is not feasible because Congress is unwilling to spend federal funds without
a politically accountable institutional supervisor, such as CPB. See, e.g., 113 CONG. REC.
26396 (1967) (Rep. Kuykendall) ("safeguards" in statute creating CPB so Congress can
control and review).
136. Elimination of the mechanisms facilitating accountability to Congress would
partially disentangle government from CPB by weakening the regulatory and control
strand of the state action nexus. But the nexus would remain if the funding connection
is not eliminated.
137. Carnegie I had suggested that half of the directors be presidential appointees
who would, in turn, select the other half. See CARNEGIE I, supra note 9, at 37. Other
suggestions would have limited the membership of the board to individuals with con-
nections to public broadcasting without altering the presidential appointment process
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pointment be retained only if the President voluntarily were to
select nominees from a list compiled by a statutory blue-ribbon
panel, chaired by the librarian of Congress.' 38 Senate confirmation
of the trustees of the Public Telecommunications Trust, the institu-
tion that would replace CPB,13 9 would be replaced by financial dis-
closure to the staff of the Library of Congress. 140
Carnegie II also proposed the creation of an autonomous Program
Services Endowment to underwrite and develop national program
production in "a safe place."'14 The Endowment's directors would
be selected by the trustees without presidential appointment; nomi-
nees to fill vacancies would be made to the Trust by the board of
the Endowment. 142
These recommendations represent notable improvements over the
present process. Nevertheless, because the political branches would
remain involved in the appointment process for the Trust, the con-
stitutional defects of the current system are not completely over-
come. 43 One alternative not considered by Carnegie II could help
achieve the necessary severing of the state action nexus. The panel could
select the trustees, and the Trust's board be self-perpetuating, filling
vacancies as they arise. This selection scheme would eliminate the
intermediate step of presidential appointment in the process and
more completely sever the state action nexus that otherwise might
link the CPB-Trust to the political appointees who serve on the panel.
itself. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 11807, supra note 81, at 220 (statement of William G.
Harley) (members of NAEB Executive Board); Hearings on S. 1160, supra note 2, at 449-50
(statement of Sen. Javits) (employees of public broadcasting stations). These proposals are
inadequate because they fail to depoliticize the selection process itself.
138. See CARNEGIE II, supra note 3, at 87. The panel members would be the librarian of
Congress, the director of NSF, the chairmen of NEA and NEH, the secretary of the
Smithsonian Institution, and one representative each from public radio and public tele-
vision. Although the nominating panel would be composed of political appointees, they
are nonpartisan, have no political function, and are therefore less likely to nominate in-
dividuals based on political considerations. These Carnegie II suggestions had been made
in 1967 by the ACLU. See Hearings on H.R. 6736, suPra note 2, at 773 (statement of
Richard D. Heffner).
139. The Trust would report to Congress, remain accountable for federal funds,
establish systemwide policies, disburse federal funds, provide equal employment op-
portunities, formulate long-range plans for the system, and protect programming ac-
tivities lodged in the Program Services Endowment. See CARNEGIE II, supra note 3, at 82.
140. Id. at 88-89.
141. Id. at 78.
142. Id. at 90-91. The original board of the Endowment would be selected from
nominees proposed by the panel nominating the trustees. Id. at 91.
143. The President would still have the discretion to select nominees whose political
preferences coincided with his. Moreover, because funding would still come from con-
gressional appropriations, the state action nexus would not be severed simply by re-
moving politics from the process of appointment of CPB directors. See p. 724 supra.
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Similarly, an added layer of insulation would be provided if the En-
dowment's directors themselves filled vacancies on the Endowment
board, obviating the need to transmit nominations to the trustees.
Two radical possibilities for severing the political connections are
licensee election of the CPB directors144 or the abolition of CPB in
favor of direct allocation of funds to PBS and to licensees. Although
these approaches would sever the state action nexus, they present
numerous disadvantages: they may well lead to conflicts of interest, 14r
unnecessary duplication, 146 and a lessening of sensitivity to the pub-
lic's expectations from public broadcasting. 147
B. A New Model-S'evering the Funding Nexus,
Financing for the Future
No structural change, by itself, will resolve the First Amendment
problems. Although creation of a Public Broadcasting Fund in the
Treasury has promoted insulation, 48 the congressional accountability
mechanisms and appropriations process make the Fund an inadequate
solution.149 As long as CPB, or the Trust, is funded through the
appropriations process, the existence of the funding strand will en-
sure a finding of state action'- 0 A financing model that will preclude
144. Cf. H.R. 12,808, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., § 201(a), 118 CONG. REc. 1724 (1972) (giving
local station managers % majority on CPB board).
145. The licensees, several of which are production entities, would, in effect, be de-
termining which among themselves received national programming grants. They could
also alter the grant formula to the detriment of the few large stations and divert
funding to the more numerous smaller licensees. Cf. Hearings on H.R. 11807, supra note
81, at 161-62 (statement of William G. Harley) (station managers on board might favor
their stations in funding process).
146. A CPB board elected by the station managers would then represent a con-
stituency identical to that of PBS. No purpose would be served in having two boards
represent the licensees.
147. CPB attempts to be sensitive to public needs and encourages the public to in-
dicate its desires. See YANKELOVICH, SKELLY & WHITE, INC., PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC
BROADCASTING (April 1977). Public participation would be lessened were the board mem-
bership to be elected by broadcasters, whose concerns are not identical to those of the
public-at-large. Moreover, the diverse nonbroadcaster telecommunication entities, with
interests different from licensees, would not be represented.
148. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(k)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1979) (insulated Fund in Treasury).
149. See, e.g., The Hollywood Reporter, July 12, 1978, at 17, col. 2 (appropriations
process makes possible congressional manipulation of the system even with an insulated
Fund). To withstand constitutional challenge, federal funding could be allocated along
content-neutral, objective standards such as audience share, nonfederal support, populace
served, or wattage. Cf. Gunn, Public Television Program Financing, 6 EDUc. BROADCASTING
REv. 283 (1972) (suggesting objective allocation formulas).
150. This situation would not be materially altered under the Program Fund created
within the present CPB or the Endowment created under the Trust recommended by
Carnegie I. The state action nexus would not be severed because both programming
bodies would depend upon federal funds for support; each would be directly responsible
to its parent, which would, in turn, be accountable to Congress.
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congressional participation in the subsidy is therefore necessary to
sever the funding element of the state action nexus.
The Carnegie II recommendations fail to address the state action
problem posed by government financing because they are concerned
only with insulation and adequate support. Carnegie II suggests that
the principal source of federal funds continue to be general reve-
nues; 151 it acknowledges, moreover, that "Congress has a legitimate
oversight role in the expenditure of federal funds .... "152 Carnegie
II "trusts," however, that First Amendment problems will be avoided
by the independent character of the trustees, insulation of the En-
dowment, the formula nature of the grant to the Endowment, and
public support for ensuring the Trust's continued independencelaa
Although the Carnegie II financing plan could ensure continued
funding, it makes no contribution to a resolution of the constitu-
tional problem, which requires that the funding element of the state
action nexus be severed.
There are several funding approaches that could achieve the neces-
sary insulation of CPB from government control. For example, the
tax laws could be used to encourage private funding for the public
broadcasting system. Private donors could be granted a partial tax
credit against their federal income tax liability for contributions to
public broadcasting. 154 Tax credits, as compared to government ap-
propriation, would weaken the funding nexus because individual
contributing taxpayers, not Congress, would control funding of the
system.155 Another device to encourage private contributions and
151. CARNEGIE II, supra note 3, at 139. The Trust would receive three separate pools,
one for matching grants to the stations, one for a programming grant to the Endow-
ment, and one for funding the Trust's national activities. Id. at 127. This suggestion
represents little change from the current model.
152. Id. at 138.
153. Id. Carnegie II bases its hopes for a system operating within constitutional
bounds on the same factors that generally have proved to be futile in achieving that
goal. See p. 728 supra (discussing safeguards of directorial independence, corporate au-
tonomy, and public visibility).
154. Granting a tax credit would benefit all taxpayers, including those who are
not able to make use of the current system of charitable deductions for contributions
to public broadcasting entities.
155. Carnegie I rejected both the imposition of additional taxes and the use of
existing taxes as a means of obtaining funding for the system without any concurrent
federal control. See CARNEGIE II, supra note 3, at 140-43. It rejected manufacturers'
excise taxes as burdening only one industry despite the wide dispersion of benefits
of public broadcasting. Id. at 141; cf. CARNEGIE I, supra note 9, at 68 (suggesting financing
through excise tax on television sets). It also rejected a tax on commercial broadcast
advertising because it would result in commercial broadcasters financing an alternative
to themselves and thereby lead to a "trade-off," a reduction in the commercial stations'
public-service performance. CARNEGIE II, supra note 3, at 141. The imposition of a tax
on the profits of commercial broadcasters was dismissed as being unduly burdensome
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provide an automatic funding source would be to implement a match-
ing grant program: donations, already tax deductible, would be
matched by government funds. 1 6 This matching mechanism would
increase the incentive to contribute because the donor would be
able to direct a greater percentage of federal funds toward his
charitable interests. 57 Moreover, it would replicate the existing match-
ing method of CPB appropriations, which promotes station incen-
tive to seek nonfederal support 5s
The most feasible funding alternative, however, would be impo-
sition of a spectrum-use fee on all commercial broadcasters. 5 One
reason for imposing a spectrum-use fee is that the users of the spec-
trum, a public resource, ought to pay for such use.10 The spectrum-
for smaller stations and as encouraging accounting deceptions by larger broadcasters
and the networks. Id. at 141-42. It also rejected a license transfer tax, see id. at 142
(limited revenues, fluctuating widely), and a set-aside of commercial broadcasters' federal
taxes to support public broadcasting, see id. at 142-43 (no new revenues, continued
congressional allocation).
156. The proposal for a direct federal matching grant program, on a sliding scale,
for contributions to charity is set out in detail in McDaniel, An Alternative to the Federal
Income Tax Deduction in Support of Private Philanthropy, in TAx INSTITUTE OF AMERICA,
TAx IMPACTS ON PHILANTHROPY 171, 192-209 (1972).
157. See id. at 201 (right to control federal funds as incentive to give). Charitable
institutions would continue to receive the same share from the federal government while
private contributions should increase. See id. at 196. Moreover, the model results in the
federal government's paying the amount it currently expends while at the same time
precluding government control. See id. at 202-03. But cf. Bittker, The Propriety and
Vitality of a Federal Income Tax Deduction for Private Philanthropy, in TAX INSTITUTE
OF AMERiCA, supra note 156, at 145, 147-52 (raising constitutional, political, and privacy
objections to matching grant system).
158. The direct match model, funded by a long-term appropriation to match all
charitable contributions, minimizes the federal control over CPB inherent in its present
biennial funding. It also is more efficient than federal support of charitable institutions
through the deduction. See McDaniel, supra note 156, at 201-02.
159. See H.R. 5333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 414, 125 CONG. RFc. H1860 (daily ed.
March 29, 1979) (suggesting use of "spectrum resource fee"). The bill's "spectrum resource
fee" was linked to both administrative expenditures in processing a broadcasting license
and the individual "scarcity value," based on a licensee's revenues, of the particular
license. The fee was payable into the general fund and CPB was to be replaced by an
Endowment for Program Development, financed by appropriating $1.50 multiplied by
the American population. See id. § 614. Carnegie II argued that charging users of the
spectrum would both make more efficient use of the spectrum and generate new
revenues. CARNEGIE II, supra note 3, at 143-44; cf. 113 CONG. REC. 26414-15 (1967) (con-
sidering and rejecting amendment that would require FCC study of charging commercial
broadcasters for spectrum-use for support of public broadcasting).
160. Cf. CARNEGIE II, supra note 3, at 382-86 (constitutional support for imposition
of fee on commercial users of resource belonging to public). The rationale for levying
the fee is, therefore, entirely different from that supporting a net profits tax on com-
mercial broadcasting. Cf. note 155 supra (imposing tax on commercial licensees' profits
disfavored). A spectrum-use fee, moreover, more completely separates government from
funding than the imposition of a tax because there is no governmental collection of the
fee, as of a tax, nor subsequent disbursal from general revenues to public broadcasting.
Public Television
use fee, however, although calculated in accordance with a statutory
formula, also has an independent justification: the payment directly
to CPB would eliminate the government control inherent in the
normal appropriations process. Use of such a fee would provide a
financing system that would sever completely the funding nexus
between CPB and the government.',"
Commercial broadcasters argue that any spectrum-use fee should
only be tied to the administrative costs associated with licensing.1 2
In addition, some citizen groups oppose the fee because, as a political
matter, it probably would be levied only in exchange for long-term
or permanent broadcasting licenses, with a possible diminution of
sensitivity to the public interest.10a Nevertheless, a spectrum-use fee
would provide a steady, nonfederal, source of funding for public
broadcasting. As a new source of revenue, insulated from congres-
sional allocation, it is superior to a tax because it would more ef-
fectively sever the funding nexus connecting the system to govern-
ment. Coupled with the proposed structural modifications in the
appointment process and the concomitant reduction in congressional
regulation of public broadcasting, use of the fee would ensure that
under the "totality of the circumstances" test CPB, and hence PBS,
would not be state actors. With the state action nexus severed, CPB
could constitutionally fund and disseminate the most "meritorious"
programming for the public broadcasting system.
161. Although Carnegie II contemplated that the income realized from such a fee
would be merely an offset against the statutory commitment, estimated revenues are
anticipated as being as high as $150 to $200 million annually. CARNEGIE II, supra note 3,
at 145. This would be sufficient to meet short-term needs. Cf. 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(k)(1)(C)
(West Supp. 1979) (1983 authorization $220 million). The shortfall could be made up
through increased private contributions generated both by the tax incentive proposals
and by increased contributions resulting from the greater viewer appreciation and aware-
ness of public broadcasting that will occur as UHF achieves comparability with VHF.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, supra note 8.
162. See PuB. BROADCASTING REP., Feb. 16, 1979, at 1-2.
163. See BROADCASTING, supra note 21, at 31; 125 CONG. REC. S2502, S2507 (daily ed.
March 12, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Hollings) (public resource fee would be in exchange
for longer or indefinite license terms).
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